Does Renewable Energy Have a Higher EROI Than Fossil Fuels?

There is new momentum behind the idea that renewable energy has a higher energy return on investment (EROI) than fossil fuels.

That contrasts with decades of consensus that the EROI of oil, for example, ranges from 18 to 35 while the range for solar is from 6 to 12.

Nafeez Ahmed wrote in a recent post that

“While the EROI values of wind and solar are “at or above 10”, the average EROI estimate for oil is about 4.2. Murphy et. al’s research concludes that many EROI analyses incorrectly compare fossil fuels with renewables by measuring them at the wrong areas. By consistently measuring them both at their ‘point of use’, they are able to develop a far more consistent approach.”

Similarly, Ugo Bardi wrote a post in January whose title was ” Setting the record straight on the EROI from renewables. It is much better than that of fossil fuels.”

Both Ahmed and Bardi used a 2022 paper, Energy Return on Investment of Major Energy Carriers: Review and Harmonization as their source.

Net Energy and EROI Essentials

Net energy is the difference between the total energy output minus the total energy input over the life cycle of an energy source or technology (Figure 1).

EROI is the ratio of the total energy output divided by the total energy input over the life cycle of an energy source.

That means that the net energy for a 10 megajoule (MJ) energy input and a 20 MJ output is 10 MJ and the EROI is 2 (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Net energy and EROI for a hypothetical energy source or technology. Source: Modified from Hagens (2010).

Table 1 shows a range of energy inputs and outputs and their corresponding EROI and net energy values. The important observation is that EROI is non-linear while net energy is linear.

For example, an EROI of 10 is twice as great as an EROI of 5 but only represents a 10% (90% vs 80%) difference in net energy or the efficiency of the transformation from source into usable energy.

It would take an EROI of about 1.9 to produce a net energy decrease of 50% compared to an EROI of 10. That’s why EROI adds more confusion than value at least for the casual user.

Table 1. Energy input and output, and corresponding EROI and net energy values. Source: Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

Red Flags

I evaluated the 2022 EROI paper by David J. Murphy and colleagues that Ahmed and Bardi cited as the source of their good news about the superior EROI of renewables.

This statement from that paper was a huge red flag for me.

“Even if crude oil were measured to have an EROI of 1000 or more at the point of extraction, the corresponding EROI at the point of use, using global average data for the energy “cost” of the process chain, would still only be a maximum of 8.7.”

This means that the supply-chain energy costs for refining and product distribution create a permanent penalty that prevents oil from reaching an EROI of more than 8.7. It furthermore implies that refining must be a marginally profitable business at best which it is not.

It suggests that all previous EROI work over the last two decades was wrong. The reason it was wrong, according to the paper’s authors, is that previous workers failed to account for the full supply chain of energy investments from extraction to point-of-use. That is simply untrue. The approach has been used at least since 2009 by Hall et al.

By the authors’ own admission, oil is the most important fuel for the global economy. An oil EROI of 4.2, however, would place it below what most researchers consider to be the minimum EROI threshold needed to support society as noted by Euan Mearns.

“It is assumed that ERoEI >5 to 7 is required for modern society to function. This marks the edge of The Net Energy Cliff.”

Below this threshold, so much of the world’s resources would have to be dedicated to supplying energy that there would not be enough left to support the rest of society. Civilization should already be in collapse at an oil EROI of 4.2.

Figure 2. The Net Energy Cliff shows how with declining ERoEI society must commit ever larger amounts of available energy to energy gathering activities. Source: Mearns (2016).

 

In this renewable energy Hail Mary, the authors reveal their fundamental failure to comprehend the significance of their EROI subject:

 

“This means that oil delivers less net energy to society for each unit invested in extraction, refining, and delivery than PV or wind. The transition to electric vehicles, according to these results, will actually increase.”

Society does not function and survive on the per-unit net energy to society but on the full-system net energy delivered to society. This is like saying that I can solve my personal financial problems by delivering newspapers because the per-unit returns are so high. The net income from the paper route is so small, however, that it wouldn’t even help with the monthly escrow payment on my mortgage.

The bottom line is that Murphy et al have not presented the data to support their conclusion that renewables in fact have a higher EROI than oil.

Lack of Transparency

The biggest problem with net energy and EROI research is that it is almost impossible to accurately identify all or even most of the energy inputs. This is compounded by different workers using diverse and sometimes incompatible methods to determine the values needed.

The stated purpose of David Murphy and colleagues’ paper was to clarify the confusion. This is an admirable and much-needed effort. They did not, however, provide the necessary data to support their findings.

There is no a table or graph in the report that allows the reader to see the input and output data and resulting net energy and EROI values for all the relevant energy sources.

There is a table that provides a comparison for fossil (thermal) fuels shown below as Table 2 (Murphy’s Table 2) but it does not show the energy data. Instead these “investments” are listed as a percentage of total for each technology. Among other things, that makes it impossible to validate the EROI calculations. There is no similar table for renewable energy sources.

I have highlighted the percentage values for oil to show the source of what I believe to be the problem.

Nearly 9% of the total post-extraction costs for oil are for refining. Yet most of the energy for refining comes from the crude oil and refined products used in the refinery. It is, in effect, co-generated. That doesn’t negate the energy investment needed to operate the refinery but it is not a cost to society as indicated in the table.

Table 2. Thermal fuel supply chain investment table. Source: Murphy et al (2022) Table 2.

Figure 3 shows how this accounting error affects the EROI calculation. It is modified from Hagens (2010) Figure 5.

The first part of the figure shows 10 megajoules (MJ) of energy coming into the refinery (“Processing) and 1 MJ being added from society. The resulting net energy to produce 10 MJ of gasoline is 8 and the EROI is 5.

In the second part of Figure 3, the identical situation is presented except the 1 MJ of refining investment is “co-generated” from the 10 MJ coming from “Extraction” and not charged to society. The net energy is 8 MJ, the same as in the first case, but the EROI is 9!

Figure 3. Two ways of depicting the EROI of gasoline production from crude oil. Source: Modified from Hagens (2010).

 

That erases much of the good renewable news reported by Ahmed and Bardi.

In Table 3, I have used Murphy et al’s oil transmission and distribution investments (their Table 2) converted from percent to energy units following the format of their Table 1. I divided their 8.9% for refining investment by 3 to account for the co-generation described above (it is probably much lower). The resulting oil EROI is 18. That completely removes the good news from Ahmed’s and Bardi’s proclamations of “mission accomplished” and restores oil EROI to the consensus range for the last two decades.

Table 3. Supply chain investments and calculation of net energy and EROI using refinery “co-generation” of energy. Source: Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

I am troubled by lack of transparency in the Murphy et al paper particularly their failure to show input and output energy data. I suppose it may be found among the 73 references but that is well beyond the ordinary standards of transparent communication. I located a link for supplementary data that only applied to fossil fuels. Unfortunately, critical inputs for this data were from the ecoinvent database which is unavailable without a paid subscription.

I confess that I do not have much confidence that Murphy et al have accounted for the energy cost for resource extraction or renewable unit production because those investments are not shown in their Table 1 or Table 2.

Another source of confusion is Murphy et al’s use of a life-cycle efficiency factor. This multiplies the energy output of renewable sources by a factor of 3.3 to adjust for their longer-term energy payout.

The efficiency factor for fossil fuels is close to 1 so it does not provide any boost. I am not qualified to dispute the use of this life-cycle term except to say that without it, wind and solar would have EROI values much lower than those for fossil energy.

Nor do Murphy et al discuss the transmission and distribution cost of electricity from renewable energy. You have only to compare your next electricity bill rate to the spot price for your region. In the United States, the retail price is 30 to 50% higher. That makes any percentage in Table 2 above (Murphy et al’s Table 2) seem trivial—including the 8.9% refining penalty that doomed oil to an EROI of 4.2! In fact, De Santis et al (2017) note that

“The cost of electrical transmission per delivered MWh can be up to eight times higher than for hydrogen, about eleven times higher than for natural gas, and twenty to fifty times higher than for liquid fuels.

Murphy et al do not address the effect of intermittency on the net energy supply that society needs to function. They tell us that technology will find a way and perhaps it will but that does not change the present upon which their study is based.

Figure 4. Gross consumption for Denmark West plotted against wind and nuclear power (scaled to meet 100% of annual demand)—examples of under- and over-supply periods indicated. Source: Kunz et al (2014).

Is Renewable EROI Higher Than Fossil Fuels? 

There is a long history of energy research that has consistently come to the same conclusion—fossil fuels are hard to beat.

We now know that their use has consequences for the environment that must be addressed. That doesn’t change the physics that explain why humans have long preferred fossil fuels over energy sources like wind and solar, and continue to even today.

The trend toward using science in the service of a cause is dangerous. This latest effort to re-write the history of net energy and EROI troubles me.

We should all ask ourselves the question, “how can I be wrong?” In that sense, I reluctantly welcome the gambit that Murphy et al, Ahmed and Bardi have opened.

At the same time, when something seems too good to be true, it usually is.

I have shown the uncertainties and problematic nuances that can lead to the misuse of EROI. It is a blunt instrument at best. It offers a quick, high-level way to compare different types of energy but little more. Net energy is a far more useful and straight-forward approach.

I favor a future society that is based largely on renewable energy. That society will look very different that what we know today. Substituting renewables for fossil fuels is not a solution without greatly curtailing our total energy consumption. That’s what the physics indicates will happen in a renewable future. I suggest that we stop trying to make renewables look like something that are not and cannot be, and just learn to live with them as they are.

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BLOG: AI IS SO MUCH SCARIER THAN DEEP FAKES

A deep-fake image of an explosion at the U.S. Pentagon triggered a 200-point stock market sell-off yesterday. This is a relatively benign example of the capabilities of artificial intelligence (A.I.).

Yesterday, I finished listening to my friend Nate Hagens’ podcast interview with Daniel Schmachtenberger “Artificial Intelligence and The Superorganism.” It was a provocative and sometimes scary discussion of the potential promise and danger of A.I.

It’s long and all of it is worth hearing but the A.I. part begins almost two hours (01:50:12) into the podcast.

Here, Schmachtenberger distinguishes between the sorts of narrow A.I.—that include deep fakes, machines that play chess, and ChatGPT—and artificial general intelligence (AGI). Google’s AlphaGo is a narrow A.I. game system that was not programed to include any human games. In 3 hours and a trillion runs, it was able to beat all previous A.I. chess programs.

Artificial general intelligence is way more than that. It’s a system that can learn to accomplish any intellectual task that human beings or other animals can perform. It doesn’t exist yet but it’s where A.I. is going.

“So the AI, because all the other tools are made by the kind of human intelligence that makes tools and AI is that kind of human intelligence externalized as a tool itself, it has a capacity to be omni-modal, right? Not dual use, omni-use more than anything else is, and omni-combinatorial.”

This means that AGI could plausibly result in the creation of an intelligent agent that could outcompete humans. This is what A.I. experts like Eliezar Yudkowsky call the singularity.

In a recent editorial in Time, Yudkowsky wrote,

“If somebody builds a too-powerful AI, under present conditions, I expect that every single member of the human species and all biological life on Earth dies shortly thereafter…Shut it all down…We are not ready. We are not on track to be significantly readier in the foreseeable future. If we go ahead on this everyone will die, including children who did not choose this and did not do anything wrong.”

I’ve followed artificial intelligence casually for a while but listening to Schmachtenberger made me to think about it differently. I can convince myself that he and Yudkowsky are perhaps imagining a worst-case scenario that has a very low probability of happening.

At the same time, I am unwilling to dismiss their concerns. There are few people who know more about A.I. than Yudkowsky and Schmachtenberger is an expert at wide-boundary systems analysis. What they are each describing, after all, is a black swan event. We’ve seen a few of those just in the last 15 years.

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Bear Market Math

What part of a bear market don’t oil analysts understand?

WTI price has fallen -$42.38 (-35%) since June 2022 (Figure 1). It has fallen -$11.71 (-14%) since mid-April.

Figure 1. What part of a bear market do oil analysts not understand? WTI price has fallen -$42.38 (-35%) since June 2022. It has fallen -$11.71 (-14%) since mid-April. Source: CME & Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

The analyst consensus seems to be that oil supply is tight and that demand is increasing strongly. Prices should, therefore, increase. The reason this isn’t happening is because the market is wrong.

But as Javier Blas recently explained,

“Purveyors of conventional wisdom would have you believe that the 25% drop in oil prices since late last year was due to softening demand in slowing economies. They — and you — would be wrong. The real problem is too much supply…Put simply, the black market for oil is booming. If one has the appetite – and the stomach – to buy crude from Moscow, Caracas or Tehran, the barrels are there. Better yet, they’re available at a discount.”
–Javier Blas

This week, Bloomberg posted an analysis which concluded that oil supply was the overwhelmingly factor responsible for the $19 decrease in price since November (Figure 2).

“Oil prices have fallen by $19 since November. Our decomposition of the drivers shows supply was responsible for $21 of the decline in crude prices, while demand’s contribution was positive at $2. The source of extra supply is sanctioned countries like Iran, Russia and Venezuela.”

Figure 2. Drivers of oil prices. Source: Bloomberg

 

Fund managers seem to agree. WTI net long positions have decreased -66% since January 2018 and open interest has fallen -40% (Figure 3). Since June 2021, net longs have decreased -62% and open interest -25%.

Figure 3. WTI net long positions have decreased -66% and open interest -40% since 2018. Net longs have fallen -62% and open interest -25% since June 2021. Source: CFTC, EIA & Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

 

Yet, most analysts cling to the belief that markets are tight and market sentiment is the problem.

“The oil market continues to be driven by external developments, rather than fundamentals.”
–ING, May 18 2023

That’s bear-market math.

 

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There is no energy transition, no paradigm shift or green revolution

The energy crisis that resulted from the Russian invasion of Ukraine seems to have passed. At least that’s the mainstream view.

Europe escaped what might have been an electric power and heating catastrophe largely because of an exceptionally mild winter. Javier Blas summarized the aftermath in  recent comments.

“In that new normal, European gas changes hands at €45 ($48) to €50 per megawatt hour. For many policymakers, who witnessed prices spiking to about €350 in August and feared blackouts and freezing homes, it’s a cause of celebration. The crisis is over, so the thinking goes from Brussels to London. Europe won, Vladimir Putin lost. I wish it was that simple.”

Many frame this outcome as a triumph for Europe’s two-decade experiment with renewable energy. In its February 2023 report European Electricity Review 2022, Ember stated that

“The gas crisis created a paradigm shift for the EU’s electricity transition. Historically Europe’s growing renewables replaced coal power, the most emissions-intensive fuel. However, as a result of soaring gas prices in the second half of 2021, new renewables replaced fossil gas instead.”

Most of that statement is untrue.

The ember report focused on electric power generation which is less than a quarter of Europe’s energy consumption. Yet even within that narrow focus, it is untrue that renewables replaced natural gas much less that a paradigm shift took place.

The percent of fossil fuel contribution to European electric power is unchanged since 2018 (Figure 1). Wind & solar rose from 17% to 23% but natural gas increased from 13% to 19%. Coal fell from 21% to 15% but nuclear fell from 28% to 21% & hydro fell from 14 to 11%.

The contribution of what Ember calls renewables–wind, solar, nuclear and hydro–actually decreased from 59% in 2018 to 55% in 2022. There are of course explanations like the low reservoir levels for hydroelectric power and the nuclear outages in France but these kinds of externalities come with the energy territory.

Figure 1. The percent fossil contribution to European electric power is unchanged since 2018. Wind & solar rose from 17% to 23% but natural gas increased from 13% to 19%. Coal fell from 21% to 15% but nuclear fell from 28% to 21% & hydro fell from 14 to 11%. Source: Eurostat & Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

Although gas consumption fell about 13% in 2022 compared to 2021, it’s relative contribution to the electric power energy mix saw the greatest increase as shown in Figure 1 and its accompanying table.

The broader perspective is that electric power only represents 23% of final energy consumption for Europe (Figure 2). That means that wind and solar only account for 5.3% of European final energy consumption, and that all non-fossil sources including wind and solar account for only 12.6%.

Fossil fuels still make up 72% of European energy consumption. The grand green experiment of the last two decades has not done much to free Europe from dependence on fossil energy.

Figure 2. European fossil fuel consumption has decreased from 77% in 2012 to 72% in 2021.Electric power has remained constant at 23% of final energy consumption. Source: Eurostat & Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

Ember is not the only source of self-congratulatory reports on Europe’s survival during the winter of 2022-2023. Yale Environment 360 published a report in March 2023 called Averting Crisis, Europe Learns to Live Without Russian Energy.

Faced with the cutoff of Russian gas and oil, Europe ramped up solar and wind power, got serious about energy conservation, and tweaked policies to speed its green transition. Despite fears of increased emissions this winter, the EU remained on track to meet its climate goals.

That is untrue. I’ve already shown that the ramp up in solar and wind was not the reason that Europe survived the winter. Nor was it something that happened in response to the energy crisis but rather was part of a progressive increase that began more than a decade ago.

More importantly, Europe began increasing LNG imports in September 2021 before the Ukraine crisis began (Figure 3). By the time Russian gas supply began to decrease in earnest, LNG had largely replaced it.

Figure 3. Europe began increasing LNG imports in September 2021 before the Ukraine crisis. By the time Russian gas supply began to decrease, LNG had largely replaced it. Source: Bruegel & Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

It may surprise some to learn that the European Union remains the third largest importer of Russian fossil fuels in May 2023. Europe continues to import Russian natural gas, petroleum liquids, LNG and crude oil (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Top five importers of Russian fossil fuels, May 1 – May 7, 2023. Source: CREA and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

This is what the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) calls the laundromat. The laundromat consists of countries that continue to import Russian fossil fuels and re-export them or their finished products back to price-cap coalition countries.  Laundromat countries include China, India, Turkey, the UAE and Singapore (Figure 5).

Figure 5. The Laundromat: How the price cap coalition whitewashes Russian oil in third countries. Source: CREA and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

For as much as I enjoy the laundromat model, it’s not that simple at least for oil. Increased volumes from the U.S. and Norway along with continued exports from Kazakhstan, Iraq, Libya and the U.K. more than compensated for the loss of Russian crude (Figure 6). The laundromat countries are presumably included in “other” although it is difficult to see any increase in that volume since the Ukraine conflict began.

Figure 6. The loss of Russian imports did not decrease the volume of total crude oil available to Europe in 2022 and early 2023. Increased volumes from the U.S. and Norway more than offset lost Russian oil. Source: Eurostat & Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol summarized the global energy situation one year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“The amount of renewable power capacity added worldwide rose by about a quarter in 2022; global electric car sales leaped by close to 60%; investments in energy efficiency jumped; installations of heat pumps surged, especially in Europe; and nuclear power is making a strong comeback.”

I doubt that any of those statements can be supported with data.

His comments certainly do not apply to Europe where there has has been more than a decade of aggressive renewable investment, where the financial policies and strength are in place, and where the motivation could not have been stronger. If not in Europe, where are Birol’s claims true?

The Cost

Largely unmentioned in the good news reporting about Europe’s renewable energy experiment is its cost. Approximately $1.2 trillion has been invested in renewable energy projects since 2004.

Figure 7 shows that the price of natural gas to Europe in 2022 was more than three times what it paid in 2021, an increase from $120 to $390 billion dollars. That’s just for the gas and does not include the cost for the new import terminals.

Figure 7. Export revenues to key natural gas suppliers to the European Union, 2022-2021 comparison. Source: IEA and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

The cost for European imports of crude oil and petroleum refined products increased €137 (+72%) (Figure 8). Some of the increase in both oil and natural gas was because their commodity prices were higher in 2022 than in 2021. Much of it, however, was because Europe was willing to pay a premium for energy security.

Figure 8. The cost for European petroleum liquids increased €137 (+72%) in 2022. Source: Eurostat & Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

European government subsidies, bailouts, and backstops to consumers and businesses are estimated to have cost about $276 billion in 2022. In addition, there are the intangible costs of lost revenues.

 

Getting Honest About the Human Predicament

Simon Michaux has analyzed the paths to phasing out fossil fuels.

“Replacing the existing fossil fuel powered system (oil, gas, and coal), using renewable technologies, such as solar panels or wind turbines, will not be possible for the entire global human population. There is simply just not enough time, nor resources to do this by the current target set by the World’smost influential nations…Inevitably, this leads to the conclusion that the existing renewable energy sectors and the EV technology systems are merely steppingstones to something else, rather than the final solution.”

His research has been attacked recently by Nafeez Ahmed and Auke Hoekstra. They challenge Michaux’s assumption that a substantial renewable energy storage buffer is needed to cover weather-related intermittency in a 100% renewable future without natural gas backup systems. They argue that technology advances and recycling will overcome most constraints on limited material resources.*

I mention this dispute between Michaux and his critics because it illustrates the gap between data and the techno-optimism of renewable energy true-believers. I favor a future based on renewables but am confident that they cannot support our current civilization’s growth expectations. I am prepared to accept and deal with the outcome of that future vision but I cannot imagine that most people will agree.

I believe that energy substitution is a doomsday stratagem that condemns civilization to its status quo path of growth & biophysical destruction.

No amount of non-fossil energy will make a difference unless we lower total energy consumption & accept its consequence of no growth.

Climate change is a big problem but it is a subset of the larger problem of overshoot. We have exceeded the carrying capacity of the planet. Continued economic and material growth based on renewable energy does not begin to resolve that fundamental reality.

Ahmed and Hoekstra typify the naive view that somehow, someone will figure all of this out. Meanwhile we should just keep pushing forward with renewable energy despite its failure to make any material difference when it was needed over the last year in Europe. They further make sport of shooting the messenger that warns them that facts do not support their plans. I wonder if they’ve seen Don’t Look Up?

What is clear a year after the Ukraine invasion is that renewables are a relatively small add-on to Europe’s energy supply. There is no energy transition. There is no paradigm shift or green revolution.

Europe survived the winter of 2022-2023 by obtaining enough fossil energy to make up for lost Russian supply. That’s not a criticism of renewable energy. It’s a fact that we must acknowledge.

 

* It is worth mentioning that neither Ahmed nor Hoekstra have training or experience in science or energy while Michaux holds degrees in geology and physics with emphasis on metallurgy, mining and engineering.

 

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BANKING CRISIS: OIL MARKET OVER-REACTION OR RESTRAINT?

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COMPARATIVE INVENTORY & GAS STORAGE REPORT APRIL 27, 2023 (2023-17 FINAL)

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COMPARATIVE INVENTORY & OIL STORAGE REPORT APRIL 26, 2023 (2023-17 FINAL)

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COMPARATIVE INVENTORY & GAS STORAGE REPORT APRIL 20, 2023 (2023-16)

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COMPARATIVE INVENTORY & OIL STORAGE REPORT APRIL 19, 2023 (2023-16)

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COMPARATIVE INVENTORY & GAS STORAGE REPORT APRIL 13, 2023 (2023-15)

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